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My main concern is based on the extent to 
which South Africa can and will continue 
playing an influential and consequential role on 
the global stage that is normatively defined and 
morally driven.
By Garth L le Pere
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South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 is often extolled as one of the most inspiring and progressive 
aspects of its public life. Its success 
has been grounded on the mutually 
reinforcing pillars of the struggle against 
apartheid and South Africa’s transition 
to democracy and constitutional rule. 
However, in recent times there has 
been growing consternation that the 
carefully crafted script of values and 
principles that have underpinned and 
guided the conduct of South Africa’s 
foreign policy have increasingly been 
compromised on the altar of expediency 
and convenience.
There are even worrisome symptoms 
concerning the institutional locus of 
South Africa’s foreign relations. For 
example, in the Sunday Times of 2 
October 2016, there was an article 
which contained some disturbing 
allegations about erratic expenditure 
patterns in the Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation 
(DIRCO). It was alleged that the Auditor-
General found that there was irregular 
expenditure of R338 million while 
expressing concern that a procurement 
contract worth R347 million did 
not meet the criteria defined in the 
original specifications. South Africa’s 
Auditor-General is known as a model 
of probity and prudence and while only 
allegations, they do cast aspersions on 
DIRCO’s ability to manage a strategic 
portfolio of public affairs. Not only 
does this denote gross dereliction in the 
management of DIRCO’s supply chain, 
but it also has profound implications for 
the department’s image as the custodian 
of South Africa’s foreign policy. 
This custodianship is embodied in 
the 2011 foreign policy White Paper 
entitled, Building a Better World: The 
Diplomacy of Ubuntu. Within the 
philosophical and normative remit 
of Ubuntu, the white paper is an 
attempt to place the affirmation of the 
humanity of others as central to the 
affirmation of a South African humanity. 
This humanist dialectic in Ubuntu is 
complemented by the principle of 
Batho Pele (putting people first) and 
takes into account the fashioning of 
a diplomatic calculus in the service of 
promoting certain values, the most 
critical being human rights, democracy, 
reconciliation, and eradicating poverty 
and underdevelopment. According to 
the White Paper, the essential tenets of 
Ubuntu as diplomacy will unfold in the 
context of promoting Pan-Africanism, 
South-South solidarity, global equity 
and justice, building partnerships with 
developed countries, and helping to 
strengthen the multilateral system.
However, in this article I want to 
argue that the virtues and values of 
Ubuntu and Batho Pele have been 
poorly served and executed in South 
Africa’s foreign policy if viewed through 
the prism of building and developing a 
global identity as a middle power which 
is committed to an active multilateralism. 
A strong argument can be made that the 
erosion of South Africa’s identity as a 
purveyor of certain norms and values 
– whose contours took on increasing 
shape during the Mbeki presidency – 
has a lot to do with the decline of its 
multilateral profile, most crucially in 
the United Nations, the World Trade 
Organisation, the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund. While 
obviously a broader problem and 
dilemma for the government, we cannot 
discount DIRCO’s culpability, especially 
its troubled institutional profile, its weak 
managerial and political leadership, and 
its human and analytical constraints. 
As a matter of fact, the first draft of 
the chapter dealing with foreign policy 
in the National Development Plan 
provided a critical but fair diagnostic 
assessment about South Africa’s global 
image, namely, that its diplomatic 
capacity was over-stretched; that its 
power and influence had declined in 
relative terms; that it was viewed as 
Janus-faced in Africa where its bona fides 
were suspect; and as a consequence, 
the country had suffered material losses 
in bargaining power and had lost trade 
and investment opportunities not only 
in Africa but more broadly.
The chapter was withdrawn and 
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subsequently revised ostensibly 
following dissent and protest about 
its accuracy by the DIRCO Minister 
Maite Nkoana-Mashebane. However, 
the initial diagnosis was suggestive 
of a country whose moral and 
political currency was depreciating. 
This depreciation, in my view, has 
become even more pronounced and 
evident under the Presidency of Jacob 
Zuma since 2009. The perception 
and reality has gathered pace of a 
new ruling aristocracy that has been 
more concerned with the trappings of 
power, self-enrichment, and wealth 
accumulation much to the detriment 
of South Africa’s global image and 
reputation. This has become a creeping 
cancer that has undermined the very 
substance and neutrality of public 
power. The ANC government finds 
itself at an intersection where many 
South Africans feel that their hopes and 
aspirations for a better life have been 
betrayed, exacerbated by growing social 
alienation, anger, and discontent among 
the country’s poor and marginalised. 
These impressions have been reinforced 
by the outcomes of the recent local 
government elections which in a sense 
was a referendum on the ANC’s moral 
authority to govern South Africa, a gain 
that was painstakingly won since its 
establishment in 1910.
On the basis of the growing cynicism 
and despair fuelled by the Zuma 
Presidency, it seems that there has been 
a drift away from the ethical foundations 
of South Africa’s foreign policy into 
an instrumentalism and ‘unprincipled 
pragmatism’ which accords more with 
public relations, perfunctory diplomacy, 
and ceremonial ephemerals than with 
the normative internationalism which 
has shaped South Africa’s foreign policy 
and concurrently, its global standing 
since 1994. We would do well to 
remember that since 1994, South Africa 
has pursued an activist foreign policy – 
informed by the historical antecedents 
in the struggle against apartheid – that 
saw a strong moral convergence (in its 
beliefs) and ethical compatibility (in its 
behaviour) with regard to the promotion 
of human rights, democracy, solidarity 
politics, and its own developmental 
needs. 
On this basis, South Africa’s 
credibility and uniqueness on the 
international stage was built on 
three axiomatic factors: a relatively 
peacefully negotiated transition to 
democracy; Nelson Mandela as the 
global embodiment of reconciliation; 
and South Africa’s emergence as 
a strategic multilateral actor under 
President Mbeki. In essence, these were 
the vectors that provided South Africa 
with vast reserves to act and behave as 
a ‘norm’ entrepreneur in international 
relations. The country was thereby 
able to exercise considerable regional 
and global influence which was quite 
disproportionate to its population size, 
material capabilities, and geographical 
location. 
This was very much in keeping 
with the moral principle relating to a 
manifest sense of duty and obligation 
that came with South Africa’s transition 
to democracy and the manner in which 
the ruling party chose to position the 
country on the global stage; or put 
another way, South Africa was able to 
meet the demands of what Immanuel 
Kant called a ‘categorical imperative’ 
which underscores conduct that is 
based on a universal precept and which 
advances the ends of human existence 
informed by a common good. And here 
we find a certain complementarity and 
resonance between the philosophy of 
Ubuntu and basic Kantian maxim which 
enjoins us to act in line with principles 
under the reasonable assumption that 
those principles are logically applicable 
to everyone else.
However and to repeat the point, the 
role of moral discourse has been eroded 
in South Africa’s foreign policy in favour 
of a more instrumentalist and functional 
type of diplomacy that is lacking in 
energy, spirit, and direction. And herein 
lies the dilemma for the White Paper 
and whether Ubuntu could provide 
the necessary impetus to recapture the 
lost discursive moral ground. Here we 
are not simply talking, for example, of 
a successful hosting of international 
events like the soccer World Cup, 
joining BRICS, providing regional public 
goods such as the North-South corridor, 
delivering development assistance, or 
participating in peace missions. 
My main concern is based on the 
extent to which South Africa can and 
will continue playing an influential 
and consequential role on the global 
stage that is normatively defined and 
morally driven. Such a role has a direct 
impact on its identity as a country that 
represents and upholds certain values 
and principles in foreign policy. The 
country was able to build and develop 
its reserves of soft power based on the 
essential purposes and ambition of its 
foreign policy project in a difficult and 
mercurial global environment where 
less developed countries and people, 
but especially those of Africa, have been 
subject to greater structural vulnerability 
and insecurity in the form of poverty, 
conflict, disease, environmental 
degradation, economic stagnation, 
social dislocation, underdevelopment, 
etc. 
The legitimacy and power hierarchy 
of the international order is still defined 
and dominated by America and the 
West. To the extent that it can be 
challenged, there is an imperative to 
move away from or at least contest the 
realist dictates of international relations. 
While still early to assess its exact foreign 
policy contours, it would seem that 
the Trump presidency will be based 
on an unequivocal assertion of the 
preponderance of American hard power 
and its vital interests in the high politics 
of war and peace. If this is the case, the 
call for normative agents to raise their 
collective voices cannot be exaggerated 
since a President Trump could turn the 
world into a more dangerous, volatile, 
and unjust place than it already is.
In his Peloponnesian War, 
Thucydides fills his epic of the war 
between Athens and Sparta with tales 
of heroism and brutality, victory and 
defeat, brilliance and stupidity, and 
honour and deceit; these binaries in 
many ways continue to shape world 
politics. But there is also an underlying 
cynicism that the brutal suffering of the 
Melians at the hands of the Athenians 
represents an ongoing dominant logic of 
realist thinking where the powerful get 
what they desire and the weak suffer 
what they must. It is in the interstices of 
these consequentialist extremes where 
we need to locate our critique about the 
nature of moral duty and the correctness 
of actions. As a consequence normative 
agency in international relations still 
matters a great deal since it defines the 
parameters in which collective action 
can take place.
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According to the Oxford IR scholar 
Andrew Hurrell, a central theme of 
current world history is the struggle 
by revisionist states (also known as 
‘middle or emerging powers’) for 
equal rights which are often overtly 
or covertly subverted by the more 
powerful developed countries. Without 
discounting the concerns of military 
confrontation between major powers 
and the nature of asymmetric conflict 
after the 9/11 assault on New York and 
Washington DC, the idea has gained 
traction that the global community 
of states and people should strive to 
promote shared values and purposes 
in the provision of global public goods 
in an international order where the 
divisions between rich and poor 
countries are more pronounced than 
ever before. How is it possible that in an 
age of unprecedented global prosperity, 
more than 2.7 billion people – mostly 
located in the developing world – still 
have to live on $2 a day or even less? 
And paradoxically, this level of 
destitution coincides with a rapid 
expansion of the circuits of global 
governance: there has been an 
exponential increase in the number of 
international institutions; in the growth 
of the scope, range, and intrusiveness of 
global rules and norms; in the growing 
diversity of global compacts; and in 
greater demands for collective action 
in the UN to deal with global problems 
and challenges. 
Hence, the normative quest for 
greater equity and justice in international 
relations has been closely linked to the 
articulation of new and different forms 
of state legitimacy and authority where 
emerging and middle powers have 
increasingly challenged traditional forms 
of statecraft and foreign policy. As such, 
new forms of soft power have been 
privileged and new forms of diplomacy 
have been rewarded insofar as these 
forms attempt to redress the structural 
and institutional deficits that exist in 
international relations, especially as 
these define the ongoing marginalisation 
and disempowerment of developing 
countries in the international system.
It has been argued that the efficacy 
of such new forms of soft power and 
new forms of diplomacy have to be 
commensurate with and constitutive of a 
strong sense of self-esteem and identity. 
What the French philosopher and social 
theorist, Michel Foucault, has called 
‘governmentality’ provides the basis for 
self-esteem and national identity and 
this has to do with how the business of 
government is conducted with respect to 
such matters as managing the economy, 
executing social policies on poverty 
and unemployment, providing welfare 
services, putting incentives in place to 
encourage the private sector and so 
on. In many ways, ‘governmentality’ 
is closely aligned with the Batho Pele 
principle of putting people first.
As such and theoretically at least, 
domestic policy is mirrored or refracted 
in foreign policy since ‘governmentality’ 
at home informs the values and identity 
narratives which a state projects abroad. 
An important Foucaultian syllogism 
suggests that while the operation of 
power can and must be a positive force 
dispersed throughout society, similarly 
that positive force can be projected 
onto the global stage to solve global 
systemic problems like poverty, human 
rights violations, humanitarian disasters, 
disease pandemics, environmental 
degradation, food and energy 
insecurity, transnational conflicts, 
financial instability and so on. Such 
a characterisation conforms to the 
concept of national role conception 
which relates to how a domestic 
consensus evolves to generate shared 
views, norms, and understandings of 
the role a country should play as part 
of a social collective on the global stage 
and in terms of an imperative of burden 
sharing and joint responsibility. Such a 
role conception is further defined and 
informed by a sense of identity which 
encourages certain forms of behaviour 
that promotes emancipatory problem-
solving in the  international arena.
This involves the shaping of 
symbolic, ideational, and psychological 
parameters that derive from the security 
of subjects with regard to their sense 
of well-being, continuity, stability, and 
safety in the domestic regime. Where a 
state is secure and confident about its 
own existence in a community of states, 
logic suggests that it will be able to 
affirm a global personality that is based 
on a consistent sense of identity and 
self-esteem in its international relations. 
In other words, the imperatives of 
citizen security focused on welfare and 
physical safety mutually reinforce a 
country’s global personality represented 
and enhanced by coherent narratives 
of society, and its role and place in the 
world; this dialectic is often referred to 
as the ‘intermestic’, represented by a 
close affinity between the international 
and the domestic. 
In terms of this logic, we can equally 
assert that where there are high levels 
of social insecurity as exists in South 
Africa in the form poverty, inequality, 
and unemployment, even coherent 
narratives of society will buckle under 
the weight of evidence to the contrary 
and hence strain the credulity of the 
country’s projected global personality. 
In this way, foreign policy becomes 
inextricably interwoven with the 
values and identity of a country and 
ex hypothesi with its subjective sense 
of dignity, honour, recognition, and 
standing. 
In the case of South Africa, there 
has been an erosion of the fabric that 
hold its citizen security and its global 
personality together, with serious 
implications for the White Paper’s 
Ubuntu underpinnings and for the status 
of its identity and stature. We can refer 
to several incidents and events which 
shape perceptions about the country 
and which have recently damaged 
South Africa’s sense of self-esteem, self-
image, and national identity. 
• While still hotly debated, there is a 
school of thought which argues that 
South Africa’s intention to withdraw 
from the International Criminal 
Court signals a retreat from helping 
to strengthen the foundations of 
Not only does 
this denote gross 
dereliction in the 
management of 
DIRCO’s supply 
chain, but it also has 
profound implications 
for the department’s 
image as the custodian 
of South Africa’s 
foreign policy. 
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multilateral governance. If anything, 
it is an attempt at asserting a 
form of ‘credentialism’ among 
an increasingly sceptical African 
audience. Moreover, South Africa 
will have great difficulty in advancing 
the principles of Ubuntu and Batho 
Pele in Africa as long as many of its 
citizens remain deeply intolerant and 
resentful towards immigrants and 
refugees from the African continent.
• It remains puzzling why South 
Africa has not ratified important 
human rights treaties such as the 
International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights and the 
Optional Protocol of the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment. These failures 
bring into stark relief South Africa’s 
refusal to support the UN General 
Assembly resolution to decriminalise 
homosexuality even though gay 
rights enjoy constitutional protection 
in the country. 
• Harry Truman, the US President 
from 1945-1952 once said “the 
President makes foreign policy”. 
In the cases of Presidents Mandela 
and Mbeki this certainly seemed to 
be the case given their exceptional 
leadership roles in guiding the 
country’s external relations during 
a turbulent period of change at 
home and abroad. However, under 
President Zuma, it would seem that 
South Africa’s international image 
has suffered serious harm; which 
other sitting head of state has 783 
corruption charges hanging over his 
head? He has thus failed to build 
on the solid normative foundations 
inherited from his two predecessors 
and much of this has to do with 
his own failures to provide moral 
leadership by constantly being mired 
in controversies and scandals of his 
own making.
• South Africa’s aggressive lobbying 
on behalf of Dr Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma to win the Chair of 
the AU Commission turned out to 
be a very divisive exercise at a time 
when the country had reaffirmed 
the centrality of the continent as a 
fundamental principle in the foreign 
policy of Ubuntu. This violated and 
went against the grain of a standing 
convention that large countries 
would not put candidates forward 
for the position but South Africa 
nevertheless went ahead in the face 
of growing acrimony and resistance 
to its tactical manoeuvers to subvert 
the convention. By all accounts, this 
incident aggravated South Africa’s 
already dented image in some parts 
of the continent and among certain 
countries, causing its leadership 
bona fides to come under greater 
scrutiny. 
• We cannot ignore the impact of any 
impending downgrade by ratings 
agencies, Standard & Poor and Fitch. 
South Africa’s credit rating currently 
stands at BBB – which is one notch 
above junk status. Its low economic 
growth – which the Reserve Bank 
forecasts at 0% this year – has 
direct consequences for its Batho 
Pele social contract. However, the 
ratings agencies have expressed 
concern about how political tumult 
under the Zuma presidency has 
threatened policy and institutional 
stability and undermined structural 
reform, especially in bloated 
and mismanaged state-owned 
enterprises. South Africa’s sovereign 
credit profile has been severely 
compromised and the country has 
lost its lustre as a primary destination 
for foreign investment, with direct 
ramifications for its global standing 
and stature. 
These cases and examples are 
emblematic of a growing pathological 
syndrome of a state that has not 
been able to ensure the security of 
its citizens with consequent negative 
effects for its personality, image, and 
reputation in international affairs which 
draws on a normative history of active 
multilateralism. This takes on added 
significance since South Africa has to 
strategically navigate its way between 
the modern world of realist geo-politics 
and power and the post-modern world 
of idealist images and influence. 
If the German philosopher, Georg 
Hegel, would have us believe that 
the state is the incarnation of reason 
and rationality, then unreason and 
irrationality are incrementally creeping 
into the anatomy of the South African 
state in its current form. In Hegelian 
discourse, the South African state 
has not lived up to its calling as the 
“universal overseer”, thus leading to 
an attenuation of its leadership and 
hegemony over society and this is 
closely tied in with the failures of the 
ruling party to maintain itself as an idea 
and reality among its support base. 
Here Antonio Gramsci, the Italian 
anti-fascist thinker, is very instructive 
when he writes: “At a certain point 
in their historical lives, social classes 
become detached from their traditional 
parties. In other words, the traditional 
parties in that particular organisational 
form, with the particular men who 
constitute, represent, and lead them, 
are no longer recognised by their class 
(or faction of a class). When such 
crises occur, the immediate situation 
becomes delicate and dangerous 
because the field is wide open for violent 
solutions, for activities of unknown 
forces, represented by charismatic men 
of destiny.”
The recent developments and trends 
in the country’s economy and polity 
will continue to be subject to delicate 
and dangerous unknown forces and 
thus represent the makings of an 
existential crisis in the South African 
state if left unchecked. And herein lie 
the ambiguities for the country’s global 
image and identity: it will be a real 
struggle and challenge for DIRCO to 
realise the liberating ethos of Ubuntu and 
Batho Pele in the present environment 
and under the current leadership. 
But the endeavour will be worth it if 
it results in a different kind of social 
contract and political culture which 
advances the frontiers of citizen security 
in a manner that is commensurate with 
re-establishing South Africa’s normative 
agency in international relations. 
On the basis of the 
growing cynicism and 
despair fuelled by the 
Zuma Presidency, it 
seems that there has 
been a drift away from 
the ethical foundations 
of South Africa’s 
foreign policy.
